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ABSTRACT
This article discusses the Idea of Europe as it is developed within the
phenomenological tradition by Edmund Husserl, Jacques Derrida and
Jan Patočka. It shows how Derrida and Patočka try to preserve the
main elements of European culture, mainly rationality and openness –
in Patočka’s terms ‘the care for the soul’ – while at the same time
avoiding Eurocentrism. According to Patočka, the care for the soul has
been lost inmodernity and needs to be restored in a revival of the idea
of Europe in post-European times. In line with Derrida and Patočka, it is
argued that in today’s post-European world a dissemination of the
ethical idea of Europe is going on that leads beyond the name of
‘Europe,’ searching for new singular articulations, for which a renewal
of the old notion of ‘care’ is a good candidate.
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What can we say of the idea of Europe, today? Today we cannot ask this question without
referring to the fragile and challenged situation of Europe’s political and cultural institu-
tions. It has become part of the European philosophical tradition, at least since the
Enlightenment, that philosophical questions need to be related to the situation in which
they are articulated. Through the centuries of modernity, man has become aware of his
historical disposition and of the historical nature of philosophy. The question of the idea of
Europe, therefore, cannot be separated from its current historical situation1.
Already more than forty years ago the political and cultural position of Europe is
characterized by Jan Patočka as being ‘ . . . definitely at an end.’2 Therefore he speaks of
‘post-Europe.’3 For Patočka, the core of European culture is the idea of a rational and
ethical way of life, which he calls, with a Platonic expression, the ‘care for the soul’. In
modern Europe, this ‘care for the soul’ has been lost, which eventually has led to the
demise of Europe. The question now is whether this care can be re-invented in post-
European times. In this article, I shall reinterpret this notion of post-Europe and its
relation to the idea of Europe as ‘care for the soul’.
First I shall briefly sketch, as a point of departure, the main elements of the idea of
Europe as they have been developed by Edmund Husserl. Then I shall discuss the
transformation of these features in texts of Jacques Derrida and Jan Patočka. This reflection
will focus on the contemporary status of the idea of Europe in post-European times,
especially with regard to the tension between the universality of this idea and its inscription
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and institutionalization in the history and culture of Europe. Finally, the question will be
raised whether we can still refer to this idea by the name of ‘Europe.’4
1. Husserl
The locus classicus of the reflection on Europe within the phenomenological tradition is
Husserl’s 1935 Vienna lecture on ‘Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity.’ In this
text Husserl makes a distinction between Europe as a geographical continent and Europe as
an idea. Husserl speaks about ‘die geistige Gestalt Europas,’ ‘the spiritual shape of Europe,’
which he describes as ‘the unity of a spiritual life, activity, creation, with all its ends, interests,
cares, and endeavors, with its products of purposeful activity, institutions, organizations.’5
This ‘unity of a spiritual life’ is a teleological idea, immanent in the history of Europe, but with
universal value, an idea of progress by rational insight – in Husserl’s own words:
the philosophical idea which is immanent in the history of Europe (spiritual Europe) or, what
is the same, the teleology which is immanent in it, which makes itself known, from the
standpoint of universal mankind as such, as the breakthrough and the developmental begin-
ning of a new epoch – the epoch of mankind which now seeks to live, and only can live, in the
free shaping of its existence, its historical life, through ideas of reason, through infinite tasks6.
The universality of this idea does not consist in the absolute certainty of an objective
scientific theory, but in the infinite task of a rational life, of ‘ratio in the constant movement
of self-elucidation,’ in the call for ‘the ultimate self-understanding of man as being respon-
sible for his own human being.’7 Such a self-elucidation implies criticism and self-alienation
as openness to a general validity beyond opinions that were traditionally taken for undis-
putable. Only that which is given with rational ‘apodicticity’ can achieve universal validity.
Man can live a rational life, therefore, through ‘self-understanding as being in being called to
a life of apodicticity.’8
This idea of a rational, spiritual life as openness and responsibility includes its own
institutionalization in the European tradition. Husserl regards the rational and free spirit
from the start as a European endeavor, rooted in ancient Greece. This is why such
a universal idea of rational life can be indicated with the name of a geographical region,
the continent Europe.
Husserl is very clear in his statement that the universal meaning and validity of this spirit
transcend the geographical space of Europe: ‘Thus we refer to Europe not as it is under-
stood geographically, as on amap . . . ’9 Nevertheless, ‘Europe’ is and remains a geographical
reference. This involves the risk of excluding specific groups or cultures from the European
tradition, a trace of which can be found in the notorious passage on Inuit and Roma that
immediately follows the last citation10. Here the inevitable relation between universality
and its appearance and development in a singular tradition manifests itself as a tension.
As is well known, in Husserl’s view the advancement of this rational spirit undergoes
a fatal turn in early modern scientific thought. The idea of reason becomes narrowed to
the scientific measurement of facts, which leads to what Husserl calls the crisis of the
modern European sciences. A discussion of this interpretation of the history of European
rationality, however, exceeds the limits of this article11. The question that will be
discussed here, is: How do we inherit, today, this tradition, its crisis and its tensions?
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2. Derrida
Derrida’s reflections on the idea of Europe, in his L’autre cap, The Other Heading, focus on
history and responsibility. For Derrida, the question of Europe and European culture is the
question how to cope with its heritage. What do we want to preserve and maintain from
Europe and its history, andwhat would have to change?How dowe inherit Europe’s legacy in
a responsible way? Under the heading of a heading (le cap) Derrida discusses several
problems of Europe’s heritage, playing with the dissemination of the term cap, caput: head,
direction, route, capital letter, money (le capital), capital city (la capitale). The responsibilities
that come with the legacy of Europe are all characterized by Derrida as double binds or
aporias.
One of these aporias concerns the friction between centralization and fragmentation
of European culture, which brings Derrida to the device ‘neither monopoly, nor
dispersion.’12 Another tension has to do with capital in the sense of money: what to do
with the hegemony of capitalism and neo-liberalism in Europe at the end of the twentieth
century? In Derrida’s view, this hegemony needs to be balanced by a policy that strives for
social and economic justice. Therefore, keeping alive the spirit of communism is one of
the responsibilities that are included in the heritage of Europe. Again, this aporia asks for
a nuanced response. Derrida wants to avoid both the terrifying totalitarian dogmatism of
communism and neo-liberal ideologies that take advantage of the fall of communism13.
He also addresses an aporia that comprises the main topic of this article: the double bind
between universality and singularity. There is no claim to universality without its expression
in a particular language and idiom, and there is no affirmation of a singular culture without
a testimony of its universal value14. Derrida gives an extra twist to this tension by discussing
the idea that Europe would lead the world towards a better future, that it would be the cap of
world historical progress. The paradox of this position is highlighted clearly in a quotation of
Paul Valéry, who describes that Europe has – and within Europe, France has – the pretention
to go ahead of world history, having as its specialty a sense of the universal15.
What does Derrida think of this aporetic sense of direction that we have inherited under
the heading of ‘Europe’? Derrida tries to avoid the too simple answers of eurocentrism and
anti-eurocentrism. While keeping a critical distance, he endorses the advancement of
democracy and human rights. At the same time, he wants to open up the notion of
direction and heading, to make Europe susceptible to other headings (l’autre cap), and
for routes that others might choose (le cap de l’autre). Moreover, the idea of a direction and
a heading needs itself to be questioned by something else than a heading (l’autre du cap) –
i.e. a relation of identity to its other that does no longer obey to the form, sign and logic of
cap. With regard to the history and future of the idea of Europe, these questions are
inevitable, and, whatever the answersmay be, the question remains, beyond every answer16.
Thus, Derrida radicalizes the Husserlian idea of Europe as a rationality that keeps
looking for openness, responsibility and self-elucidation. According to Husserl this idea
was a teleology immanent in the history of Europe. Derrida tries to open up this idea of
openness by leading it beyond any teleology, by questioning teleology as such. He
suggests that this questioning is not only the responsibility of Europe for its own legacy,
it is what Europe, as responsibility itself, should stand for:
And what if Europe were this: the opening unto a history for which the changing of the
heading, the relation to the other heading or the other of the heading, is experienced as
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always possible? An opening and a non-exclusion for which Europe would in some way be
responsible? For which Europe would be, in a constitutive way, the very responsibility? As if
the very concept of responsibility were responsible, right up to its emancipation, for
a European birth certificate?17
In short, the idea of Europe is responsibility, the responsibility to open up and renew itself,
again and again, by critical rational reflection18. In Derrida, this reflection has changed from
a search for apodicticity to an exploration of aporias. Actually, the search for conceptual
clarity and apodicticity always necessarily gets stuck in aporias and double binds19.
These aporias do not undermine the notions of responsibility and Europe, by making
them completely relativistic. On the contrary, aporias like these are constitutive for respon-
sibility. According to Derrida, a real decision can only be made if it is not pre-determined by
an objective rule, if there is really something to choose: ‘I will even venture to say that ethics,
politics, and responsibility, if there are any, will only ever have begun with the experience and
experiment of the aporia.’20 Responsibility is aporetic in itself. At the end of L’autre cap,
Derrida gives a whole list of aporetic duties, of which I mention a few here21:
● to welcome strangers in order to let them integrate and keep their otherness at the
same time;
● to criticize both totalitarian and capitalistic ‘dogmatisms’ that jeopardize
democracy;
● to accept the European heritage of democracy, not as given and accomplished, but as
a promise of what remains to come;
● to tolerate and respect what refuses to place itself under the authority of reason,
while remaining faithful to the ideal of Enlightenment, looking for a new
Enlightenment;
● and, more in general: to respond responsibly to the call of a European heritage,
while opening Europe for what is not European.
One of the paradoxes of Derrida’s approach of Europe, as it culminates in this list of
aporias, seems to be that it combines a highly abstract notion of openness with concrete
political issues. As a result of this, the discussion of the idea of Europe is mixed up with
political and cultural problems of institutions in Europe as a geographical unity. In this
article, however, I only focus on Europe as name for the idea of a rational life.
There are important differences between Husserl’s view of the history of this idea and
Derrida’s re-assessment of it. Whereas Husserl describes the history of Europe as driven
by an inherent teleology, Derrida problematizes this teleology from within. Europe’s
history can no longer be taken as a history with a telos or cap, its heading has become an
openness beyond any heading. And whereas Husserl shows how the idea of Europe gets
stuck in a crisis in modernity, Derrida discerns several developments that are interwoven
in modern Europe’s history. Much more than Husserl, Derrida emphasizes the impor-
tance of the Enlightenment for European history and its influence on emancipation,
democracy and human rights.
In other publications than The Other Heading, Derrida has depicted different views of
Europe, especially of the world domination of forces that all have their origin in Europe.
If we take together several texts in which Derrida discusses different elements of the idea
of Europe – though not always under the heading of ‘Europe’ – we can sketch a more
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complete picture of his thoughts on Europe. In Spectres de Marx Derrida has composed
a table of ‘ten plagues of the new world order’ that scourge the world and are mainly
caused by globalized capitalism22. In Foi et savoirDerrida refers to the ‘strange alliance’ of
Christianity, secularization and ‘tele-techno-scientific capitalism,’ which he calls mon-
dialatinisation (what might be translated as globalatinization) that dominates juridical
and political discourses worldwide23. From a Husserlian point of view, the tendencies
described by Derrida in such a critical way, can be seen as a result of the fatal turn that
scientific rationality has taken in early modern Europe.
On the other hand, a critical approach of these developments presupposes another
perspective that is European as well: a rational critical questioning that prolongs the idea
of Europe as it was sketched by Husserl. Derrida’s prolongation, however, is very
different from Husserl’s history of Europe. Whereas Husserl emphasizes the problematic
development of the idea of rationality in early modern science, Derrida stresses another
modern European movement: the Enlightenment. A ‘new Enlightenment’ should be
invented, that keeps alive the spirit of rational criticism in an ever innovative way24.
As a result, Derrida’s reflections on Europe show us an alternative history, a complex
intertwining of contradictory developments. We can discern here, on the one hand,
a techno-scientific, economic and political domination of the world by, mainly western,
multinationals and other forces, in one word globalization. On the other, there are
tendencies like the spreading of democracy, political equality and human rights, includ-
ing a critical reflection on the above mentioned political domination, as well as on its own
openness – these might be seen as elements of the ‘new Enlightenment’ that Derrida was
looking for. The discourse of human rights and equality, however, can as well be
sustained and corrupted by global capitalist powers. This is at stake in the global dispersal
of a universal idiom of international law, forgiveness and other ethical and political
terminology, the above-mentioned mondialatinisation.
In conclusion, Derrida continues the phenomenological reflection on the idea of
Europe, stressing its openness and (self)-critical rationality. In his approach, Europe
should be seen as being this openness itself. The heritage of modern Europe is versatile:
the critical spirit of the Enlightenment, as well as its propagation of human rights, bears
the opportunity to be renewed, although it is overshadowed by a many sided (scientific,
technological, political, religious, cultural) rationality of calculation and manipulation.
3. Patočka
Jan Patočka’s reflections on Europe elaborate on Husserl’s analyses and are constellated
around the same themes as Derrida’s, showing remarkable similarities but also many
differences. Patočka follows Husserl by seeking the kernel of European culture in
a rational way of life that searches truth beyond mere opinions, looking for a rational
justification of beliefs and choices, for what is right beyond personal interests. Just like
Husserl, he locates the roots of this rationality in ancient Greece. He finds a good
articulation of this rational attitude in Plato’s notion of ‘the care for the soul,’ which
Patočka also discusses as ‘spiritual life,’ ‘living in truth’ or ‘insight.’25
From the start, however, rational life, according to Patočka, is confronted with its
limits, in the sense that man will never be able to survey the world as a whole. The
rational ‘apodicticity’, which Husserl was looking for, cannot always be found. Patočka
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criticizes the modern tendency towards subjectivism and ‘Cartesianism’ that he comes
across in Husserl’s philosophy. His alternative is an ‘asubjective phenomenology’ or
‘phenomenology of the appearing as such,’ in which he states that neither Husserlian
consciousness nor Heideggerian Dasein plays the main role in the appearing of phenom-
ena. The world as a whole has a primacy in the appearing, the human subject is only
involved by the world in making things appear26. What makes us human is our soul, our
ability to truth, that is, our relation to the field of appearing: humans can relate not only
to the beings that appear but also to Being or to the appearing as such. This includes
taking a position with regard to the world as a whole and to our own existence as a task.
Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology thus leads to a different version of the Husserlian
notion of a rational life of self-elucidation through openness and responsibility. The
pursuit of a maximum of rational clarity results in an oscillatory movement between
radical questions and preliminary answers, between epistēmē and doxa. This attitude, the
care of the soul, or the living in truth, is, according to Patočka, what constitutes the kernel
of European culture27.
This is not a static view on the idea of Europe. Like his teacher Husserl, Patočka
discerns a historical development in European culture, which is taken as determining for
mankind and for world history. The core of history as such is the history of Europe, that
is the history of the care of the soul. This history is not a teleology. On the contrary,
Patočka sees history as a continuous tendency of decline, against which the care of the
soul has to resist.
In his fifthHeretical Essay, Patočka discerns three main periods in the history of the care
for the soul. The first period starts in ancient Greek culture, when the supposed divine
natural orderings of mythical culture are radically questioned for the first time. Here begins
the search for a rational understanding of world structures and of human existence. The
sacred mysteries of mythical culture were experienced in what Patočka calls the demonic
and the orgiastic, events in which humans lose control and give in to sacred powers. But the
rational questioning attitude enables humans to relate to the sacred in a rational and ethical
way. The demonic and orgiastic power of, for instance, Eros is ‘disciplined and made
subservient’ by subordinating it to the rational idea of the Good28.
The second period is Christianity. The idea of the Good is replaced by a personal God,
who endows humans with responsibility by a gift of love, beyond rational understanding.
Humans are finite and mortal, their soul becomes characterized by an unfathomable
depth, and they are part of an historical struggle between good and evil. Despite the
restrictions of rational questioning by the Christian faith, Patočka regards the Christian
version of the care of the soul as the highest result in the struggle against decline, mainly
because of its ‘abysmal deepening of the soul’, combining the questioning rational
attitude with the awareness of human finitude29.
In modernity, however, the use of reason undergoes a radical change, it becomes
disentangled from the care of the soul and deteriorates to a solely technological and
instrumental reason:
The great turning point in the life of western Europe appears to be the sixteenth
century. From that time on another motif comes to the fore, opposing the motif of the
care of the soul and coming to dominate one area after another, politics, economics,
faith, and science, transforming them in a new style. Not a care for the soul, the care to
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be, but rather the care to have, care for the external world and its conquest, becomes
the dominant concern30.
The historical route of development that Patočka sketches, thus follows the main lines of
Husserl’s philosophy of history in his Crisis of the European Sciences: in early modernity,
the concept of rationality takes a fatal turn31. Whereas Husserl focused on the develop-
ment of scientific knowledge, Patočka broadens this to a cultural movement, combining
Husserl’s view on history with Heidegger’s critique of modernity as a time of ‘framing’ or
Gestell32, a world in which things can only appear as objects of calculation, control and
manipulation33. In Patočka’s view, modern civilization is made possible by ‘ . . . the rise of
an entirely new kind of rationalism, the only one we know today: a rationalism that wants
to master things and is mastered by them.’34
In the fifth and sixth Heretical Essays, he outlines modern technological culture as one
of decline. The enormous technological developments have not been balanced by an
insight in its purposes and possible meanings. Since human freedom can now only be
conceived in a negative way, as a ‘freedom from . . .,’ it gives way to experiences like
boredom, decadency and meaninglessness. The domination by calculative, economic and
instrumental rationality has led to a being dominated by gigantic anonymous technolo-
gical powers that have no meaning or goal in themselves. One of the disastrous results of
this development is the return of the demonic and orgiastic in huge orgies of violence in
the world wars of the twentieth century that have led to the demise of Europe as a world
power. The twentieth century has become a century of war, ‘ . . . an epoch of the night, of
war and of death.’35
In different texts Patočka has given different nuances to the history of the care of the
soul. In Plato and Europe, he mentions Democritus and Plato as two philosophers who
have developed this idea in their own way. In Europa und Nach-Europa, he makes
a distinction between the ethical and the epistemological side of rational reflection,
taking Plato and Democritus as their first antagonists. In addition, he describes how in
modern Europe the epistemological and technical trait of the idea of Europe completely
overshadows the ethical side. Thus, the ‘European principle’ (the reflection that grounds
action and thought by insight) can be divided into, on the one hand, Europe as a united
political, social and spiritual reality (the institutionalizations of the ethical European
spirit) and, on the other hand, the actual European heritage (Europas Erbe, what the
inheritors actually have taken over and have taken for granted: science, technology,
rational economic and social organizations)36. The generalization of this European
heritage, in the latter sense, has gone together with the end of Europe as a historical
world power. Patočka wants to reawaken the other aspect of European history: Europe as
institutionalized ethical insight (sittliche Einsicht)37.
In an earlier text from the 1950 s, Supercivilization and its Inner Conflict38,
Patočka calls the modern effort of technical and economical world domination
a ‘supercivilization.’ He distinguishes between a moderate and a radical form of
this rational civilization. Radical supercivilization claims that it can determine and
control everything and solve all problems of life and humanity. Its moderate
alternative is aware of its limits and tries to maintain an openness to culture.
Whereas radical supercivilization tends towards totalitarianism, moderate supercivi-
lization stands for liberalism, pluralism, democracy and human rights. The contrast
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between these two tendencies, however, rests on a deeper problem of modern
culture: it regards man as an individual atom in relation to other individuals and
to natural facts and forces, it lacks the openness for a transcendence that is
constitutive of the care of the soul. Moderate supercivilization has forgotten that
. . . the individualism of Renaissance and Protestantism that finally serves as the basis for the
conception of human rights, is anchored in a more profound level, where man is not
indifferent towards man, in a level where one does not count with the usual and customary
human “nature,” but where one calls for the possibility and human capacity to resist the
apparent necessity and absolute superiority39.
Because of this subjectivist modern individualism, moderate supercivilization could not
resist the power of its radical counterpart. The dialectical tensions between individual
freedom and domination, which are inherent in modern culture, let radical superciviliza-
tion in the end prevail.
At the end of his life, however, in ‘The Obligation to Resist Injustice’40, a text that he
has written for Charta 77, Patočka explicitly refers to the high standard of human rights,
with an implicit reference to Kant:
The idea of human rights is nothing other than the conviction that even states, even society as
a whole, are subject to the sovereignty of moral sentiment: that they recognize something
unconditional that is higher than they are, something that is binding even on them, sacred,
inviolable, and that in their power to establish and maintain a rule of law they seek to express
this recognition. [. . .] . . . already a hundred and eighty years ago, precise conceptual analysis
made it clear that all moral obligations are rooted in what wemight call a person’s obligation to
himself –which includes, among other things, the obligation to resist any injustice done him41.
Despite its too subjectivist and individualist foundation, therefore, the idea of human
rights still seems to refer to a transcendent validity. Although this last quotation has to be
seen as an exception, one can find here at least a tension in Patočka’s reflections on the
Enlightenment.
In Patočka’s varied analyses of modern European culture, however, the grand picture
of the development of rational life remains the same: in modernity, the care of the soul is
lost and a radical calculative and technical rationalism takes over European culture. This
results in a very dark portrayal of Europe in the twentieth century, a century ruled by the
dark powers of war. All the ‘good causes’ to fight for, ‘all the ideas of socialism, of
progress, of democratic spontaneity, of independence and freedom,’ the ideals of ‘day,
life, peace’ are meaningless in themselves. They serve as ideologies that hide the forces of
total mobilization, the rationality that makes even life and death calculable, the forces
that ‘plan death impersonally and statistically, as if they were merely a reassignment of
roles.’ In short, what stands for day, life and peace is in service of night, death and war, of
the unleashing of forces of the ‘Age of Energy’42.
As a result, Europe has lost its global dominance, lost its colonial empires and its
prestige. It may seem that after the twoWorldWars finally peace has come to Europe, but
Patočka does not agree with such a suggestion. Europe is only ‘in a state of demobiliza-
tion,’ but the war, the twentieth century as war, has continued as a cold war and in the
form of oppressing global economic and political relations. As long as humans are
concerned with their lives and their possessions, life will always lead to war:
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Life would so much like just to live at last, but it is precisely life itself which gives birth to war
and cannot break free of it with its own resources. [. . .] War as the means of releasing Force
cannot end43.
But has the second half of the twentieth century not shown immense economic growth
and prosperity in Europe, as well as cultural democratization in Western Europe?
According to Patočka, however, this prosperity is directly linked to the oppression of
other parts of the world, just like the growing democracies of the nineteenth century had
built huge colonial empires:
The gigantic work of economic renewal, the unheard-of, even undreamed-of social achieve-
ment which blossomed in a Europe excluded form world history, shows that this continent
has opted for demobilization because it has no other option. That contributes to the
deepening of the gap between the blessed haves and those who are dying of hunger on
a planet rich in energy – thus intensifying the state of war44.
As long as modern humanity takes ‘to live and to have’ as the main goals of its existence,
life will always be dominated by the forces of war, even if it masks itself as peaceful
demobilization:
War is here showing its ‘peaceful’ face, the face of cynical demoralization, appealing to the
will to live and to have [. . .], chaining humans to life and rendering them most
manipulable45.
Since Europe has lost its role as the economic and political power in the world, Patočka speaks
of Post-Europe. The one-sided development of the ‘European principle’ has expanded around
the world and at the same time outstripped Europe as a geographic power46.
The inheritors are not only Europe’s ‘legitimate descendants’ (North-America), but
also ‘pre-European’ cultures (Asia and Africa). According to Patočka, this is not well
acknowledged in historical and political reflections in the second half of the twentieth
century. He refers to the historian Geoffrey Barraclough and to a discussion between
Raymond Aron and Herbert Marcuse, who all see positive challenges in the new devel-
opments, but take too much of a European perspective:
Three things have to be objected against Barraclough’s effort to write a history of the present
that establishes a shift of the center of world power from Europe to non-Europeans and
discovers a new world situation. Firstly: he supposes one humanity as an actually already
Europeanized humanity. Secondly: he takes the European historical periodization without
further ado as world historical, without considering the possibility, or even necessity, that
there might be a pre-European, a European (antiquity, middle ages, modernity) and a post-
European historical period. Thirdly: he cannot really outline the current situation, since he
leaves aside that against which it inherently reacts47.
Patočka’s Europa und Nach-Europa is an effort to outline an alternative view that shows
the core of the idea of Europe, against which the developments described by Barraclough
and discussed by Aron and Marcuse, react from the inside48. As we have seen, this core is
the care for the soul. The main question Patočka brings to the fore in his texts on Europe
and post-Europe, therefore, is this: ‘Can the care of the soul, which is the fundamental
heritage of Europe, still speak to us today?’49 Is it possible to revive another under-
standing of human life, a spiritual life of rational insight, a life of responsible self-
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understanding that is able to open itself to transcendence, to lasting values that lie beyond
its own urge to survive?
Since a reawakening of this insight always remains possible, Patočka does not give up
hope. We can find a testimony of this hope at the last two pages of the fifth Heretical
Essay, where he refuses to answer the question in the title of this essay – ‘Is Technological
Civilization Decadent, and Why?’ – with a clear yes, because it is still possible to under-
stand human life and history50. The even darker description of the twentieth century as
war in the sixth essay also discusses the front experience in the first world war as an
experience of freedom and as a possible ‘means to overcome force’51. Exactly at the
deepest point of the decline of European history, this experience shakes and shocks the
illusive ideals of peace and light, and opens up the possibility of a conversion toward
a new rational insight in human existence. This momentum, however, did not lead to
a decisive historical turn.
Why has this grandiose experience, alone capable of leading humankind out of war into
a true peace, not had a decisive effect on the history of the twentieth century, even though
humans have been exposed to it twice for four years, and were truly touched and trans-
formed thereby?52
The answer Patočka gives to his own question, is that these are individual experiences that
need to be translated in a common and shared experience, a new common movement of
those who don’t believe anymore in the dead end of European modernity.
The means by which this state is overcome is the solidarity of the shaken; the solidarity of
those who are capable of understanding what life and death are all about, and so what
history is about. [. . .] Only one who is able to grasp this, who is capable of conversion, of
metanoia, is a spiritual person53.
If many people share the same loss of belief in the ideologies of techno-scientific and
economic forces, are ‘shaken in their faith in the day, in “life” and “peace,”’ then
a powerful reaction against ‘Force’ should be possible. This reaction can only have
a negative form. It has to be a denial of the permanent mobilization of technical forces
and economic organization and cannot offer a concrete positive alternative in terms of
a new goal to strive and fight for. It can only reawaken the awareness of man as open to
the field of appearing, to critical rational responsibility:
The solidarity of the shaken can say “no” to the measures of mobilization which make the
state of war permanent. It will not offer positive programs but will speak, like Socrates’
daimonion, in warnings and prohibitions. It can and must create a spiritual authority,
become a spiritual power that could drive the warring world to some restraint, rendering
some acts and measures impossible54.
In this context Patočka speaks of sacrifice as an action that cannot be positively under-
stood from a calculative point of view55. Those who dare to sacrifice what has economic
value for them, for example, their career, will ‘find themselves forced to separate truth
and the public realm, have forced upon them a state of war, dictatorship from within and
from without, secret diplomacy, lying, and cynical propaganda’56. Thus, even in the era of
Post-Europe, there is still hope for a cultural conversion, although this was not the
outcome of the front experience. A ‘solidarity of the shaken’ is still called for.
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A proper historical understanding of post-Europe, as we have seen in Patočka’s
criticism of Barraclough, should be open for other perspectives, also perspectives from
pre-European cultures. A revival of the care for the soul might originate in different
places than expected from a European point of view. This is also what post-Europe
means: not only the decline of political dominance, and not only an analysis of the
deplorable state of the idea of Europe in the second half of the twentieth century, but also
a new phase in world history, where a renewal of spiritual life might come from non-
European cultures.
In order to be susceptible to new forms of a rational life in truth, we need to under-
stand history as ‘nothing other than the shaken certitude of pre-given meaning’57. A good
understanding of history is neither idealistic nor materialistic. The powers of history,
Patočka states, are not ‘economic-objective’ but a ‘collective-subjective phenomenon’:
‘The economic relations and production powers only deliver the general framework in
which the struggle for power unfolds’58. Decisive in history is the ethical act and its
historical sedimentation that resists the historical tendency towards decay:
It is important to understand that historical insight is not knowledge of “ideas,” that history
is not about “knowledge” and its application, but that it is a matter of insight in the profound
ethical relations of rise and fall, of the possibility of freedom and its undermining. Ethical
insight [sittliche Einsicht] is nothing but a sedimentation and codification of its experience: it
is all about the rise and fall of the human soul . . . 59
The question that Patočka leaves for us, then, forty years after his reflections, is whether
today we can discern some sedimentations of this ethical insight, some signs of
a reawakening of the care of the soul in a post-European world.
4. The Idea of Europe in a post-European era
Before taking a look at the contemporary relevance of Patočka’s and Derrida’s reflections
on the idea of Europe, it is good to make a comparison between them. Both emphasize
Europe as rationality, responsibility and openness. An important difference can be found
in the place of the Enlightenment in these reflections. For Derrida, the ideals of
Enlightenment are of immense importance for the idea of Europe. They stand for critical
openness and continuous correction. Perhaps surprisingly, Patočka hardly mentions the
Enlightenment in his books on Europe60. The rise of the democracies and of constitu-
tional states in Western Europe since the nineteenth century, as well as the institutiona-
lization of freedom of speech and of other human rights, are developments that have
sprung from the Enlightenment and that can hardly be overlooked as sedimentation of
the ethical idea of Europe, of a life in truth and insight. Patočka, however, stresses that the
European democracies were also imperial regimes and in the twentieth century mainly
defended the status quo instead of renewing it61. Even more, the ideals and achievements
of the Enlightenment were not strong enough to guide the powers that were unchained
by modern science and technology, mainly because modern subjective individualism has
lost track with the care for the soul and is the counterpart of techno-scientific rationalism.
Thus, in short, whereas Derrida highlights the role of the Enlightenment in Europe
and discusses both the negative sides of globalization and the positive potentials of the
spirit of the Enlightenment – although they are often contaminated by economic and
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ideological forces –, Patočka underlines the fall of Europe, the moral decline that mirrors
its technological and economic successes, and also contributed to Europe’s self-
destruction in war. For Patočka, the freedom of Enlightenment and the dominance of
techno-scientific force are two sides of the same coin of modernity.
But the passage on human rights in Patočka’s Charta 77 manifest suggests that it must
be possible to connect the idea of the care for the soul with important notions of the
Enlightenment, like liberty and individual rights, not by simply repeating them, but in
order to renew, ameliorate and sustain these notions – although Patočka nowhere
explicitly elaborates on this. Such a new justification of human rights should not be
based on modern individualism, but on an understanding of human existence as
a surrender to others and as openness to the fundamental level of appearing, as care
for the soul62. A ‘new Enlightenment,’ to use Derrida’s expression, would then be part of
a new phase in the history of the care for the soul.
Despite Patočka’s criticism of modernity and despite Derrida’s critique of mondiala-
tinisation, therefore, it is possible to find connection with the ‘sedimentation and
codification’ of ‘ethical insight,’ like the United Nations and several charters of human
rights. In the twenty-first century one can see a steady growth of the institutionalization
of international law. The United Nations have played an important role in this develop-
ment, which has not only led to lawsuits in the International Court of Justice in The
Hague where crimes against humanity are successfully sentenced, but which has also
inspired non-European tribunals. To give just an example, in May 2016 the former
dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, has received a life sentence for crimes against humanity,
torture and war crimes. This conviction was given by judges of the Extraordinary African
Chambers in the Senegal court system, also called Universal Court, and which is an
initiative of both Senegal and the African Union. This was the first universal jurisdiction
case to proceed to trial in Africa. Universal jurisdiction is a principle of international law
that allows national courts to prosecute the most serious crimes even when committed
abroad, by a foreigner and against foreign victims. This innovation in international law in
Africa is not simply exported by Europe, but it is inspired by a notion of universal
international justice that has its historical roots in the idea of Europe. This is just an
example of the prolongation of what we might call an enlightened idea of justice beyond
Europe and largely independent from Europe, in other words, a step in the post-
European development of the institutionalization of rational life.
Another example of this institutionalization can be found in the twenty-first century
art world. Since Enlightenment and Romanticism, art has become the sphere of free
expression that find its goals in itself, is innovating itself again and again, and is also
a source for critical reflection. In recent years, more and more non-European arts and
artists are getting access to the international art world which was until recently still
dominated by western cultures. The Venice Biennale, for example, testifies of the growing
number of non-Western artists that participate in the realm of free artistic expression
that used to be a Europe-centered bulwark63.
The partial inclusion of Enlightenment in the history of the care for the soul, therefore,
sheds light on the ongoing development of the idea of Europe in a post-European era.
Therefore, we have to take the reflections of Patočka and Derrida one step further, by
questioning the name itself of ‘Europe’: is it still necessary to connect the ideas and ideals
of openness, insight and life in truth to the name of ‘Europe’?
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Derrida still seems to do this, in a paradoxical way. In his view, Europe needs to
be opened to what is not European, but at the same time he calls this openness itself
Europe64. Patočka speaks of post-Europe, but with this term he mainly refers to the
loss of political power of European states, as well as the situation of world history
after the demise of the idea of Europe. If we recognize in ‘post-Europe’ a new phase
in world history where a renewal of spiritual life might come from non-European
cultures, then we can ask: Do we still have to refer to the idea of openness and
insight with the name of ‘Europe’? The answer is: no, although we can make an
exception. In the context of European culture and politics, the name ‘Europe’ still
makes sense. For European politicians and philosophers, the inheritance of Europe
requests to keep the idea of Europe alive. This is the responsibility of European
intellectuals, to hold on to the idea of Europe as responsibility65. But from a global
point of view, we can disconnect the idea of a life in care, truth and insight, of
radical openness and responsibility, from the name of ‘Europe’ to which it was
attached for so long. In fact, at least parts of its ethical sedimentation have already
entered a post-European phase.
Rodolphe Gasché gives several reasons to continue designating this idea with the name
of Europe. It would be ahistorical, e.g. to ignore its European descent and birth
certificate66. His main argument, however, is based on the intrinsic link between the
singular and the universal:
By labeling this conception “Europe,” one acknowledges the intimate connection of all
thought [. . .] to a singular “agent” [. . .], thereby guarding the concept from becoming
abstract and forcing the particular into subservience and submission67.
But at the same time, because of the openness of this same idea, ‘the name Europe must
also be abandoned’68. Finally, Gasché concludes:
In fact, it is not simply a question of either being faithful to the memories of Europe or of
preferring the openness of the open to its opposite. Rather, the question is how to meet both
contradictory exigencies of preserving and abandoning Europe’s name at the same time69.
Gasché’s arguments, however, to hold on to the name of ‘Europe,’ are not convincing. Giving
op Europe’s name does not mean to ‘think ahistorically.’ On the contrary, it means to
acknowledge the new historical developments of this idea that have led it beyond Europe.
In addition, the connection between an idea that claims universal validity and its ‘singular
agent,’ can bemaintained as well by other names, be they ‘living in truth,’ ‘care for the soul,’ or
‘new Enlightenment.’ In contrast to Gasché’s conclusion, therefore, I argue that in today’s
post-European world a dissemination of the ethical idea of Europe is going on that leads
beyond the name of ‘Europe,’ searching for new singular articulations. Today, reflecting on
the ethical idea of Europe, we can say that it has started a post-European phase.
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Lumières?’. Jan Patočka starts his book Plato and Europe with a comparable remark on
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